Donation after circulatory determination of death (DCDD) is an accepted practice in the United States, but heart procurement under these circumstances has been debated. Although the practice is experiencing a resurgence due to the recently completed trials using ex vivo perfusion systems, interest in thoracoabdominal normothermic regional perfusion (TA-NRP), wherein the organs are reanimated in situ prior to procurement, has raised many ethical questions. We outline practical, ethical, and equity considerations to ensure transplant programs make well-informed decisions about TA-NRP. We (...) present a multidisciplinary analysis of the relevant ethical issues arising from DCDD-NRP heart procurement, including application of the Dead Donor Rule and the Uniform Definition of Death Act, and provide recommendations to facilitate ethical analysis and input from all interested parties. We also recommend informed consent, as distinct from typical “authorization,” for cadaveric organ donation using TA-NRP. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Why Worry about Future Generations?, Samuel Scheffler argues that we typically love humanity, and that this attachment gives us reasons to care about future generations. The paper explores this idea with an eye to understanding better the sense in which humanity is an object of attachment. The paper argues that the humanity we love should be understood in an enriched rather than a reductively biological sense, as a species that has historically sustained a complex set of cultural and (...) personal meanings. Caring about this object will lead us to be concerned about future generations. But these reasons of love should not be understood as reasons to be concerned directly about the fate of individual future people. The paper concludes with some reflections about the attachment-independent value of humanity in the enriched sense, distinguishing between relational and non-relational interpretations of this independent value. (shrink)

This paper examines the work of Nāgārjuna as interpreted by later Madhyamaka tradition, including the Tibetan Buddhist Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). It situates Madhyamaka skepticism in the context of Buddhist philosophy, Indian philosophy more generally, and Western equivalents. Find it broadly akin to Pyrrhonism, it argues that Madhyamaka skepticism still differs from its Greek equivalents in fundamental methodologies. Focusing on key hermeneutical principles like the two truths and those motivating the Svātantrika/Prāsaṅgika schism (i.e., whether followers of Nāgārjuna should offer positive arguments or (...) should proceed on a purely “negative” basis), it argues that the Svātantrika commitment to mere conventional practice is robust and allows for a skepticism consistent with the scientific practices we must take seriously in the modern world. These findings are put forth as an illustration of what the Western tradition might gain by better understanding of non-Western philosophy. (shrink)

Kant maintains that while claims to property are morally possible in a state of nature, such claims are merely “provisional”; they become “conclusive” only in a civil condition involving political institutions. Kant’s commentators find this thesis puzzling, since it seems to assert a natural right to property alongside a commitment to property’s conventionality. We resolve this apparent contradiction. Provisional right is not a special kind of right. Instead, it marks the imperfection of an action where public authorization is lacking. Provisional (...) right thereby functions as a methodological device in a sequential elucidation of the moral basis of public law. To develop this reading, we first explain Kant’s two-step account of property rights—his division between ‘having’ and ‘acquiring’. Then we explain what is involved in a sequential exposition of right more generally. (shrink)

Journal of Global Ethics, Volume 9, Issue 3, Page 249-262, December 2013.

Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism is intended for advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate students in courses within behavior analytic curricula dealing with conceptual foundations and radical behaviorism as a philosophy. Each chapter of the text presents what radical behaviorism says about an important topic in a science of behavior, and then contrasts the radical behaviorist perspective with that of other forms of behaviorism, as well as other forms of psychology.

In what sense must global ethics be global? In one sense, it must deal with global issues. In another, it must not be parochial but inclusive of normative views from around the world. So far, global ethics has met the first standard much better than the second. Authors based in the global South contribute approximately 5% of the internationally published research on global ethics. With this in mind, the co-editors of this special issue sought to bring more perspectives, experiences, and (...) authors from India into the international global ethics conversation, and so they launched the Indian Global Ethics Initiative. Their first step, this special issue, presents Indian experience and authors on topics including urban development, care ethics, women’s empowerment, fair trade, distorted policy research, poverty, and health. Much of this work is grounded by the authors’ experience in policy-making and advocacy for social and global justice. The co-editors invite contact from interested readers who would like to join and continue this Indian Global Ethics Initiative, as well as readers who would like to take similar initiatives in other regions. (shrink)

the smallest scales-why a molecule of water gets hot in a microwave oven, or how a uranium atom splits in a nuclear reactor. The rules of quantum mechanics are often counterintuitive and seem incompatible with our everyday experiences. Over the past century, deeper understanding of quantum mechanics has given scientists better control of the quantum world and quantum effects. This control provides technologists with new ways to acquire, process, and transmit information as part of a new scientific field known as (...) quantum information science (QIS). (shrink)

As a contribution to development ethics, this article attempts to clarify what 'empowerment' should mean, in so far as it is a valuable goal. I begin with the core ethical idea of empowerment that is to be found in recent work on measuring empowerment, led by Deepa Narayan, namely: empowerment occurs when people are better able to shape their own lives. Since this is a metaphor, I attempt to articulate a corresponding literal meaning. What I find is that people are (...) empowered to the extent that: (a) they exercise enhanced decision-making and influence over strategic life-choices and barriers to agency and well-being freedom; (b) their capacity for such decision-making and influence has also been enhanced; and (c) they are capable of making these gains prevail, given (i) the capabilities they have and assets they control, individually or collectively, and (ii) the opportunity structure in which they act. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that dissociative identity disorder (DID) is best interpreted as a causal model of a (possible) post-traumatic psychological process, as a mechanical model of an abnormal psychological condition. From this perspective we examine and criticize the evidential status of DID, and we demonstrate that there is really no good reason to believe that anyone has ever suffered from DID so understood. This is so because the proponents of DID violate basic methodological principles of good causal modeling. (...) When every ounce of your concentration is fixed upon blasting a winged pig out of the sky, you do not question its species' ontological status. James Morrow, City of Truth (1990). (shrink)

Focusing on episodes of student-generated and -sustained talk during document-based disciplinary history discussions, this study explored what teacher candidates prioritize and value about social studies discussions, and how these priorities align with their actions and goals as facilitators. Using a complex systems-based model, we investigated candidates’ goals as they planned for, facilitated, and reflected upon student sensemaking relative to three common orientations for social studies discussions: disciplinary history, participatory civics, and critical literacy. Findings revealed that candidates employed elements from all (...) three orientations, yet without clear alignment to any particular approach. This misalignment reflected tensions between candidates’ stated goals, beliefs about student engagement, and instructional decisions. We draw implications for teacher education to support candidates in developing coherent practices for discussion facilitation that align with their instructional visions and sociocultural contexts. (shrink)

Abstract:Subject As Freedom (1930) is correctly regarded as Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's magnum opus. But this text relies on a set of ideas and develops from a set of concerns that KCB develops more explicitly in essays written both before and after that text, which might be regarded as its intellectual bookends. These ideas are important and fascinating in their own right. They also illuminate KCB's engagement with Kant and with the Vedānta tradition as well as his understanding of freedom itself, including (...) its soteriological dimension. These two essays are "Sankara's Doctrine of Māyā" (1930) and "The Advaita and Its Spiritual Significance" (1936). We explore KCB's conception of philosophy and its relation to spiritual practice through a close reading of these two essays. (shrink)

In The Idea of Justice , Amartya Sen argues for an approach to justice that is comparative and realization-based rather than transcendental and institutional. While Sen’s arguments for such an approach may not be as convincing as he thought, there are additional arguments for it, and one is that it provides a unique and valuable platform on which an account of justice as a virtue of social and political actors (including institutions and social movements) can be built. Hence new dimensions (...) of comparison are opened up: some actors are better disposed and more successful than others at leading social change in the direction of greater justice. The main objective of this article is to use the capability approach to construct such an account. Six dimensions of acting justly are identified: (1) reducing capability shortfalls; (2) expanding capabilities for all; (3) saving the worst-off as a first step towards their full participation in economy and society, (4) which is also to be promoted by a system of entitlements protecting all from social exclusion; while (5) supporting the empowerment of those whose capabilities are to expand; and (6) respecting ethical values and legitimate procedures. I conclude by sketching some underlying moral psychology. (shrink)

Theoretical models of schizophrenia have traditionally emphasized the biological social, and environmental forces that lead to the dysfunction that characterizes this disorder. However important these aspects may be, an understanding of schizophrenia is incomplete without attention to the first-person perspective of those who continue to struggle to find meaning and security in the midst of this disorder. Encouragingly, an interest has grown steadily in recent years in understanding subjective experience in schizophrenia, and can be found within a range of bodies (...) of research, including.. (shrink)

Many of the ethical problems that are posed by development can be illuminated by clarifying some of the differences between development that is worthwhile and ethically undesirable ?maldevelopment?. So it is with development projects that displace communities that physically stand in their way: typically the ?oustees? are victimized and disempowered, in some cases by projects that are also indefensible in other ways. Can this help us to clarify what is owed to people who are displaced by climate change, the ?climate (...) migrants? or ?climate refugees?? These people, I will show, have a distinctive set of moral entitlements, which may include compensation and aid for resilience or resettlement; in addition, they are entitled to be included in decision-making in ways that are empowering. (shrink)

Cleopatra VII, the last of the Ptolemaic rulers of Egypt, reveled in perfume (Plutarch, Life of Marcus Antonius 26.2). She even used it in her seduction of the Roman general Marc Antony. Sailing up the river Cydnus to meet him, she reclined in a canopy spangled with gold, adorned like Venus in a painting. Boys dressed as cupids fanned her and wondrous scents from incense offerings wafted along the riverbanks. Not long after her death in August 30 BCE, a book (...) circulated under her name called Cleopatra’s Cosmetic, full of recipes for fragrant oils and cleansers (Totelin 2017: 114–18). (shrink)

The present paper examines three issues from the perspective of Skinner's radical behaviorism: the nature of mentalism, the relation between behaviorism and mentalism, and the nature of behavioristic objections to mentalism. Mentalism is characterized as a particular orientation to the explanation of behavior that entails an appeal to inner causes. Methodological and radical behaviorism are examined with respect to this definition, and methodological behaviorism is held to be mentalistic by virtue of its implicit appeal to mental phenomena in the account (...) of how knowledge is gained from scientific endeavors. Finally, it is noted that the behavioristic objection to mentalism is pragmatic: mentalism interferes with the effective explanation of behavioral events. (shrink)

The conception of a private event as an inferred, theoretical construct is critically examined. The foundation of this conception in logical positivist epistemology is noted, and the basis of the radical behaviorist alternative is presented. Of particular importance is the radical behaviorist stance on the contributions of physiology and private behavioral events to psychological explanations. Two cases are then reviewed to illustrate radical behaviorist concerns about private events, theoretical terms, and the relation between them. The first is the position of (...) cognitive psychology toward internal states and processing mechanisms. The second is the recent suggestion that even radical behaviorists regard the private event as an inferred, theoretical construct. (shrink)

Paul Helm’s Faith With Reason articulates and defends an account of reasonable religious faith that claims that religious faith consists of both cognitive and fiduciary elements. One part of religious faith consists of propositions about the object of religious devotion whose strength “ought to conform to the evidence for the proposition in question, ” if they are to held reasonably. Religious belief is not a special species of belief, says Helm, but is subject to the same standards of evidence and (...) criticism as other beliefs. In addition to the epistemic and evidential aspects of religious faith one must add the element of trust. Faith is distinguished from mere notional assent by the fact that the persons of faith actively entrust themselves to God, and depend upon Him to bring about various good purposes they deem to be of great importance. (shrink)

In our original piece, we suggested that contemporary phenomenological models of schizophrenia such as the ipseity-disturbance model emphasize perceptual and cognitive elements of self-disturbances, potentially neglecting the presence and central importance of painful affect in the experience of schizophrenia. We concluded that integrating affect within developing phenomenological models would offer not only a theoretical advance but also a possible path to more effective recovery-oriented treatment. In response, Phillips agrees there is incontrovertible evidence of painful affect central to the experience of (...) schizophrenia. He expresses concerns though about a danger in falsely reducing.. (shrink)

Evan Thompson has written a marvelous book. Waking, Dreaming, Being blends intellectual autobiography, phenomenology, cognitive science, studies in Buddhist and Vedānta philosophy, and creative metaphilosophy in an exploration of what it is to be a person, of the nature of consciousness, and of the relation of contemplative to scientific method in the understanding of human life. I have learned a great deal from it, and the community of philosophers and cognitive scientists will be reading and discussing it for some time. (...) But I have come to criticize Thompson, not to praise him. Here I raise a few issues regarding Thompson’s treatment of the self and the connections between his own account and the Madhyamaka and... (shrink)

Foraging for coherence is a pragmatist philosophy of the brain. It is a philosophy anchored to objects and instrumental in understanding the brain. Our age is dominated by neuroscience. A critical common sense underlies inquiry including that of neuroscience. Thus a pragmatist orientation to neuroscience is about foraging for coherence; not overselling neuroscience. Foraging for coherence is the search for adaptation – diverse epistemic orientation tied ideally to learning about oneself, one’s nature, and one’s history in the context of learning (...) about the brain. Neuroscience is about us: Our desires, habits, styles of reason, human vulnerability, and abuse. The language of the neuron, or the gene, or the systems does not replace the discussion about us as the person, in the social and historical context. (shrink)

Christopher D. Stone has claimed that natural objects can and should have rights. I accept Stone’s premise that the possession of rights is tied to the possession of interests; however, I argue that the concept of a natural object needs a more careful analysis than is given by Stone. Not everything that Stone calls a natural object is an object “naturally.” Some must be taken as artificial rather than as natural. Thistype of object cannot be said to have intrinsic interests (...) and hence cannot be given rights that can protect “its own sake”-which is the sort of right that Stone focuses on. Further, there are other sorts of natural objects which, although they are objects “naturally,” cannot meaningfully be said to have intrinsic interests, and thus cannot have the sorts of rights that Stone is concerned with. Finally, there are other sorts of natural objects which are objects naturally and which have intrinsic interests, but which are not proper candidates for the possession of rights. The prerequisites for being “owed” rights are the possession of intrinsic interests and the capability to suffer when those interests are interfered with or denied or threatened. (shrink)

Killing bin Laden: A Moral Analysis is a short treatise on the possible ethical justification for the U.S. mission to kill Osama bin Laden. After rejecting the standard justifications most commonly used in support of the killing, Strawser ultimately argues that the killing was ethically permissible as an act of defensive harm on behalf of innocents. The book contends bin Laden was morally responsible for a collection of unjust threats such that he was liable to be killed. Moreover, the many (...) unique features of the bin Laden case -such as the use of pre-emptive harm and the collective agency of al-Qaeda - do not defeat that liability. The monograph also includes discussions of the apparent violation of Pakistan's sovereignty and the morally dubious celebrations of bin Laden's death, among other morally relevant issues. (shrink)

Most people believe that killing someone, while generally morally wrong, can in some cases be a permissible act. Most people similarly believe that war, while awful, can be justified. This book addresses both subjects as equal parts in a larger meditation on the ethics of harm and moral responsibility—whether in war collectively or in individual cases of self-defense—and whatever it is that lies in between the two. The book sets out by examining the moral justification for individual defensive killing and (...) then tests its application to collective war as a natural outgrowth of the former. In seeking sincere answers to these morally vexing questions, it offers a novel theory of liability attribution based upon evidence-relative norms: we should only be held morally responsible for what we could possibly know is wrong based on the evidence before us. In developing this theory of liability as it applies to war, Bounds of Defense also gives a robust apologia of what has been called as “revisionist” just war theory and charts a neo-liberal basis for just war theory grounded on the value of individual autonomy along the way. The entire book is an earnest attempt to take individual rights and responsibilities seriously in our thinking over killing and the horrors of war. (shrink)

This paper performs a critical review of twin and adoption studies looking at possible genetic factors in criminal and antisocial behavior. While most modern researchers acknowledge that family studies are unable to separate possible genetic and environmental influences, it is argued here that twin studies are similarly unable to disentangle these influences. The twin method of monozygotic–dizygotic comparison is predicated on the assumption that both types of twins share equal environments, and it is argued here that this assumption is false. (...) Adoption studies have been promoted as a better way of separating genetic and environmental influences. However, there is good reason to believe that adoption studies of criminal and antisocial behavior were confounded by selective placement factors. In addition, these studies suffered from bias and serious methodological errors. In spite of these problems, no adoption researcher claimed to have found evidence of a genetic predisposition for violent crime. It is concluded that the weight of the evidence from family, twin, and adoption studies does not support a genetic basis for any type of criminal or antisocial behavior. The historical background of genetic theories of criminality is also discussed. (shrink)